SECOND
DIVISION
|
|
|
|
|
|
PELBEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Substituted by Pelagia Beltran, and Virginia Malolos, Petitioners, - versus - HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and THE REPUBLIC OF THE Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - x ALADDIN F. Petitioners, - versus - REPUBLIC OF THE ( Respondent. |
G.R. No. 141325 G.R. No. 141174 Present: PUNO, J., Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: |
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
PUNO, J.:
Before us are the consolidated cases
of “Pelbel Manufacturing Corporation,
Substituted by Pelagia Beltran, and Virginia Malolos v. Court of Appeals and
the Republic of the Philippines” and “Aladdin F. Trinidad and Aquilina C.
Bonzon v. Republic of the Philippines (Laguna Lake Development Authority),”
appealing the Court of Appeals’ November 14, 1997 Decision[1]
in CA-G.R. CV No. 23592 and December 22, 1999 Resolution,[2]
which reversed the Regional Trial Court’s (RTC’s) Decision[3]
dated September 12, 1988 in Land Registration Case No. 243-A. The RTC granted the application of
petitioners Pelagia Beltran, Aladdin F. Trinidad and Virginia Malolos to have
the parcels of land situated in
The facts, narrated by the
Court of Appeals, are as follows:
The
original applicants for registration are Pelbel Manufacturing Corporation, Aladdin
Trinidad and Virginia Malolos. The lots
sought to be registered are two parcels of land covered by Plan Psu-240345, the
first parcel having an area of 28,181 square meters, more or less and the
second parcel having an area of 2,070 square meters, more or less. Both parcels of land are situated [in]
The
case was set for initial hearing on
Earlier
on March 28, 1985 however, the Laguna Lake Development Authority filed a
Manifestation (Record, pp. 30-31) stating that, as per projections of the
subject lots in the topographic map prepared by the Bureau of Coast and
Geodetic Survey using technical description of the lots approved by the Bureau
of Lands, subject lots are situated below the elevation of 12.50 meters, thus
forming part of the bed of the Laguna Lake in accordance with Sec. 41
(paragraph 11) of Republic Act No. 4850 as amended by P.D. No. 813.
On
April 22, 1985, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Opposition
(Record, p. 40) alleging that neither the applicants nor their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto;
that the applicants’ claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish
Title or grant can no longer be availed of for failure to file the appropriate
application for registration within six (6) months from February 16, 1976 as
required by P.D. No. 892; and that applicant Pelbel Manufacturing Corporation
is disqualified, being a private corporation, to hold lands of the public
domain except by lease pursuant to Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution.
On
May 3, 1985, a Motion For Substitution of Party Applicant was filed by Pelbel
to substitute Pelagia P. Beltran in its place as applicant with respect to
17,500 square meters of the lot applied for, which Motion was granted by the
lower court (Record, p. 48).
On
May 4, 1985, the lower court rendered the assailed Decision (Record, p. 49)
adjudicating the parcels of land applied for in favor of the following: Pelagia Beltran – 17,500 square meters; Aladdin
Trinidad – 2,500 square meters; Virginia Malolos – 10,251 square meters
(Appellant’s Brief, p. 3; Rollo, p. 260), based on the following findings:
The aforecited established facts support the application for registration
of the two parcels of land subject of the present application. The applicants have satisfactorily proven
their peaceful, continuous, and public possession of the said parcels of land for
over a period of thirty years and no person or persons had/have disturbed their
possession thereof nor interposed any formal opposition to the instant
application. The subject parcels of land
being within the disposable portion of the public domain, the applicants are
therefore entitled to the registration of their titles to the parcels of land
subject of this case. The Provincial
Engineer of Rizal attested to the effect that the subject property will not be
affected by any government highway as shown in the clearance marked as Exh.[s]
H and H-1 of the applicant corporation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court confirms and declares the
applicants as the true and absolute owners of the parcels of land subject of
this application, situated [in] San Juan, Taytay, Rizal and let therefore an
order be as it is hereby ordered issued for the registration of the titles to
the subject land in the following proportions in favor and in the names of:
a)
17,500 square meters unto Pelagia Beltran, 60 years
old, married to Geronimo Beltran, Filipino citizen, and a resident of Gen.
Segundo St., Pasig, Metro Manila;
b) 2,500 square meters unto Aladdin F. Trinidad,
54 years old, married to Perfecta Trinidad, Filipino citizen, and residing at
Valle Verde, Pasig, Metro Manila; and
c) 10,251 square meters unto Virginia Malolos,
50 years old, married to Eliseo Malolos, Filipino [c]itizen[,] and residing [on]
Macopa St., Quezon City.
as pro-indiviso owners in fee simple of the
parcels of land indicated in Psu-1445109 (Exh. G), particularly described in
the corresponding technical description (Exh[s]. G-1 and G-2) upon payment of
the required fees therefor.
(Record, pp. 56-57)
A Motion to Amend Order of General Default
and Set Aside Decision dated
On August 29, 1985, applicant Aladdin F. Trinidad,
in his Motion to Segregate the land applied for by him from Plan PSU-[240345]
stated that the LLDA’s position was untenable based on Supreme Court decisions
in Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Santos del Rio, 131
SCRA 532 and Bautista vs. Court of Appeals and Santos del Rio, 131 SCRA 532
which held that parts around Laguna de Bay which become covered with water four
to five months a year, not due to tidal action, but due to rains cannot be
considered a part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay nor as a foreshore
land. LLDA filed an Opposition stating
that in the aforementioned cases the Supreme Court failed to apply Sec. 41
(paragraph 11) of R.A. 4850 as amended by P.D. 813 in resolving the issue of
whether or not subject lots are public land.
Paragraph 11 of R.A. 4850 as amended states:
(11)
In his Rejoinder, [Aladdin]
On
Acting upon LLDA’s Motion, the lower court in
an Order dated
On October 17, 1988, the OSG filed a Motion
to Dismiss applicants-appellees’ application on the ground that there was no
valid amendment and republication of the application relative to the
substitution by Beltran as applicant in lieu of Pelbel [C]orporation which the
court denied in an Order dated January 12, 1987, stating:
After going over the
above-mentioned arguments set forth by
The record disclose[d] that
acting on a Motion for Substitution of Party-Applicant, dated
Being a private person, Applicant
is not covered by the constitutional prohibition invoked by
On the claim of Oppositor
Republic of the Philippines, that the substitution was an attempt to circumvent
the constitutional prohibition against private corporations, the Court can just
add that the applicant Pelbel
Manufacturing Corporation in conveying the property applied for by it has in
its favor the disputable presumption that private transactions have been fair
and regular pursuant to the provisions of Rule 131, Section 5, sub par. (p) of
the Rules of Court. Said presumption is
deemed satisfactory if uncontradicted but may be contradicted and overcome by
other evidence. The record disclose[d]
that no evidence was ever presented to contradict said disputable presumption
in favor of the applicant private corporation.
The alleged failure to notify
On the second ground for the
dismissal of the Amended Application for failure to republish the same, the
Court agrees with Applicant Trinidad that considering that the amendment on the
application does not affect any increase or alteration of the area of the
property applied for but pertains only to an amendment of the joinder or
discontinuance of the parties, no republication of the Amended Application is
necessary.
(Record, p. 192)
On
In this appeal, the Office of the Solicitor
General assigns the following as errors:
1. THE
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
APPELLEES FAILED TO ADDUCE ADEQUATE AND SUBSTANTIAL PROOF THAT THEY AND THEIR
PREDECESSORS[-]IN-INTEREST HAVE BEEN IN OPEN[,] CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND
NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF THE LOTS SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED SINCE JUNE 12, 1945 OR
PRIOR THERETO.
3. THE
During the pendency of this appeal, the
Spouses Abraham and Aquilina Bonzon filed an Intervention over Lot No. 2 of
PSU-242343 included in the land being applied for in the name of Virginia
Malolos (Rollo, pp. 324-334). The
instant case was declared submitted for decision with intervenors’ brief as
well as that of Pelbel Manufacturing Corporation.[4]
On
On
Hence, this appeal.
Petitioners Pelbel Manufacturing Corporation, substituted by Pelagia
Beltran, and Virginia Malolos base their appeal on the following grounds:
I.
THE LOTS IN QUESTION ARE
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE[5]
A. The conclusion of the Court of Appeals that
the lots in question are not alienable and disposable because of the absence of
a certification from the Government that the lots are alienable and disposable
is not supported by the evidence, and is clearly contrary to the undisputed
evidence on record.[6]
B. The conclusion of the Court of Appeals that
the lots in question are part of the
C. Elementary logic dictates that if the lots
with houses and the roads between the subject lots are alienable and
disposable, then the subject lots are alienable and disposable.[8]
D. The findings and conclusions of the trial [c]ourt
are in accord with the facts, the law and the evidence.[9]
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
AS A MATTER OF LAW IN REVERSING THE HOLDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE
PETITIONERS AND THEIR PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST HAD BEEN IN OPEN, PUBLIC AND
ADVERSE POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY IN THE CONCEPT OF OWNERS FOR MORE THAN 30
YEAR IS BASED ON MERE CONJECTURES[,] SPECULATIONS AND GENERALIZATION.[10]
A. The findings of facts of the trial [c]ourt on
the credibility of witnesses are binding on the Court of Appeals.[11]
B. There are no substantial reasons of the Court
of Appeals for reversing the conclusion and finding of the trial [c]ourt.[12]
C. The ruling of the trial [c]ourt ought to be re-instated
and upheld, as a matter of law and established jurisprudence.[13]
On the other hand, petitioners Aladdin F. Trinidad
and Aquilina C. Bonzon cite the grounds for their appeal in the following manner:
FIRST GROUND
Is the Questioned Decision
And Resolution Of The Hon. Court Of Appeals Supported By Evidence And Which Is
Contradicted By The Evidence Of The Petitioners In The Record (Tolentino vs. De
Jesus, et al., L-32797, 27 March 1974).
SECOND GROUND
Has The Hon. Court Of
Appeals Disregarded The Applicable Laws And Decisions Of The Hon. Supreme Court
in the below cases:
1. Director of Lands vs. Hon.
Court of Appeals, et al.[,] G.R. No. L-43105,
2. Aurora Bautista, et al. vs.
Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 43190,
in deciding this case which
cases interpreted the laws applicable to this case on the basis of the facts
established by the evidence in the records.[14]
In sum, the two consolidated petitions raise the
following issues:
(1)
Whether the subject parcels of land are public land;
and
(2)
If they are not public land, whether applicants-petitioners
have registrable title to the land.
We uphold the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners, in this case, applied for registration of title to two
parcels of land covered by Plan Psu-240345.
Both parcels of land are located in
We hold that petitioners failed to show that the parcels of land subject
of their application are alienable and disposable. The government, through the Laguna Lake
Development Authority, established that the areas sought to be registered are
below the statutory minimum elevation of 12.50 meters, hence formed part of the
bed of
The following are of public
dominion:
(1) Rivers
and their natural beds;
(2) Continuous
or intermittent waters of springs and brooks running in their natural beds and
the beds themselves;
(3) Waters rising continuously or intermittently
on lands of public dominion;
(4) Lakes and lagoons formed by Nature on
public lands, and their beds;
x x
x
(Emphases
supplied.)
Petitioners
invoke the case of Bautista v. Court of Appeals,[20]
claiming that the inundation was merely due to the rains, and that the water
elevation should be determined from the highest ordinary depth during dry
season. They cite Art. 74 of the Law of
Waters of 1866 which defines the extent of a lake bed as “the ground covered by
their waters when at their highest ordinary depth,” and the case of Government of the Philippine Islands v. Colegio de San Jose[21] which defines the phrase “highest ordinary depth” as the highest depth of
the waters (the Laguna Lake, in this case) during the dry season, such depth
being the regular, common, natural depth which occurs always or most of the
time during the year. It is contended
that the measurement of Laguna Lake Development Authority Geodetic Engineer
Merida of 12.19 meters as the highest observed elevation of the subject lots
was made in November,[22]
which is still rainy season. We disagree
for while November is not part of the summer season, it is not part of the
rainy season either. It still is part of
the dry season during which the waters are at their “highest ordinary depth.”
Further, we agree with the ruling of the appellate
court that the fact that a few of the other estates in the vicinity had
succeeded in being registered, and that there are already existing houses and
roads between Laguna Lake and the subject lots, does not prove that the subject
lots are not part of the Laguna Lake bed. Mr. Ananias Mariano registered 6,993 square
meters of land in his name under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 8906
which land appears to be even located farther from the lake than the subject
lots, while Juvencio Ortañez registered 84,238 square meters of land in his
name under OCT No. 55351 which land is situated near the margins of the Laguna
Lake. The land titles of these two
individuals only prove that they are the owners in fee simple of the respective
real properties described therein, free from all liens and encumbrances except
such as may be expressly noted thereon or otherwise reserved by law.[23] They do not prove petitioners’ title to the
subject lots. Further, in Ledesma v. Municipality of Iloilo,[24]
this Court held that “simple possession of a certificate of title, under the
Torrens System, does not make the possessor the true owner of all the property
described therein. If a person obtains a
title, under the Torrens System, which includes by mistake or oversight land
which cannot be registered under the Torrens System, he does not, by virtue of
said certificate alone, become the owner of the lands illegally included.” It is basic principle that prescription does
not run against the government. In Reyes v. Court of Appeals,[25]
we held:
When the government is the
real party in interest, and is proceeding mainly to assert its own rights and
recover its own property, there can be no defense on the ground of laches or
limitation. . .
Public land fraudulently
included in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or reverted to
the State in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act. Prescription does not lie against the State
in such cases for the Statute of Limitations does not run against the
State. The right of reversion or
reconveyance to the State is not barred by prescription.
We further uphold the Court of Appeals in ruling that petitioners-applicants
presented no substantial evidence that they and their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the entire area in question, in the concept of owner since
Petitioners presented Pedro Bernardo, their common
predecessor-in-interest, as witness.
Bernardo testified, as follows:
Q Before this land was sold to Potenciana
Espiritu, how long have you owned this land before you sold this to Potenciana
Espiritu?
A I have been the owner of this
property for 25 years.
Q Before the same was sold to
Potenciana Espiritu what did you do with the land when you were still the owner
of the land?
A The land is devoted to
planting of palay.
Q Do you have a tenant who till[s]
the land for you?
A The tenant died.
Q Did he die before you sold
the property or after?
A After I sold the property to
Potenciana Espiritu, the tenants died, however, he was able to work as tenant
for Potenciana for a period of about 4 or 5 years.
Q When you were in possession
of this property for about a period of 25 years do you know of any other person
who have claimed right or interest?
A None that I know.
Q Can you tell us if you were
in possession of the property continuously, publicly, adversely to the whole
world?
A Yes, sir, peaceful because
there is no adverse claimant. It is
continuous and public and adverse to the whole world.[26]
The above-quoted testimony of Pedro Bernardo is clearly
insufficient. No other proof was
presented to establish Bernardo’s possession and
occupation of the more than three (3) hectares of land sought to be registered. Possession is open when it is visible and
apparent to a common observer.[27] Continuous possession consists
of uninterrupted acts of nonpermissive possession of property by the current
occupants and their predecessors.[28] To be notorious, possession must be so
conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public[29]
or at least by the people in the vicinity of the premises.[30]
Mere possession of land[31]
and the making of vague assertions to the public that a possessor is claiming
the land[32]
are not sufficient to satisfy the requirement of open and notorious possession. Bernardo failed to show that his
alleged possession and occupation were of the nature and duration required by
law. Bare and general allegations,
without more, do not amount to preponderant evidence that would shift the burden
to the oppositor, in this case, the Republic.[33] Further, it militates against the claim of
actual possession under a claim of ownership since June 1945, that the subject
properties were declared for taxation purposes only in 1980, or five (5) years
before the filing of the application.[34]
IN
VIEW WHEREOF,
the Petitions of Pelbel Manufacturing
Corporation, substituted by Pelagia Beltran, and Virginia Malolos,
and Aladdin F. Trinidad and Aquilina C. Bonzon are DENIED. The Court of Appeals’
Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
[1] G.R.
No. 141325 rollo, pp. 37-59.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] Ibid.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] G.R. No. 141174 rollo, pp. 14-15.
[15] Republic v. Herbieto, G.R. No. 156117,
[16] Republic
v. Manna Properties, Inc., G.R. No. 146527,
[17] Zarate
v. Director of Lands, G.R. No. 131501, July 14, 2004, 434 SCRA 322; Director
of Lands v. Buyco, G.R. No. 91189, November 27, 1992, 216 SCRA 78, 94, citing
Santiago v. De los Santos, 161 SCRA 146.
[18] Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended
by P.D. No. 1073.
[19] G.R. No. 141174 rollo, pp.
70-71.
[20] G.R. No. 43105,
[21] 53 Phil. 423 (1929).
[22] G.R. No. 141174 rollo, p. 71.
[23] Dy v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 97929,
[24] 49
Phil. 769 (1926), cited in Widows and Orphans Association, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91797, August 28, 1991, 201 SCRA 165, 175-176.
[25] G.R.
No. 94524, September 10, 1998, 295 SCRA 296, cited in East Asia
Traders, Inc. v. Republic, G.R. No. 152947, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 716,
726.
[26] G.R.
No. 141325 rollo, pp. 57-58.
[27] Marengo Cave Co. v. Ross, 212 Ind. 624, 10 N.E.2d 917 (1937); Striefel v. Charles-Keyt-Leaman Partnership, 1999 ME 111, 733 A.2d 984
(Me. 1999); Hoffman v. Freeman Land and Timber, LLC., 329 Or. 554, 994 P.2d 106
(1999).
[31] Ruggles v. Dandison, 284 Mich. 338, 279 N.W. 851 (1938); Morgan v. Jenson, 47 N.D. 137, 181 N.W. 89 (1921); Baxter v. Girard Trust Co., 288 Pa. 256, 135 A. 620, 49 A.L.R. 1011
(1927).
[33] Republic v. Enciso, G.R. No.
160145,
[34] G.R. No. 141325 rollo, p. 58.